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INCREMENTALISM V. DISJUNCTURE: THE 
PRESIDENT AND AMERICAN POLITICAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
Marc Landy* 
J. DAVID ALVIS, JEREMY D. BAILEY, & F. FLAGG TAYLOR, IV, THE CONTESTED 
REMOVAL POWER, 1789–2010 (2013). Pp. 264. Hardcover $ 34.95.  
 
MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FORGOTTEN PRESIDENTS: THEIR UNTOLD 
CONSTITUTIONAL LEGACY (2013). Pp. 313. Hardcover $ 34.95. 
 
In studying the development of the presidency one is faced, as with the development 
of virtually any institution, with a decision about whether to emphasize incrementalism or 
disjuncture in explaining its path. Either choice will inevitably serve to illuminate as well 
as to becloud important truths. The Contested Removal Power, 1789-2010 takes the route 
of disjuncture.1 As the title indicates, it focuses on the struggle between the president and 
Congress over that power, with the courts periodically intervening to give points to one 
contestant or the other. Although the struggle is ongoing, the book concentrates on key 
episodes that have resulted in momentous change: the decision of the first Congress to 
grant the president removal power; the promotion of the principle of rotation in office by 
presidents Jefferson and Jackson; the Congressional challenge to the removal power cul-
minating in the impeachment of Andrew Johnson; the reassertion of presidential removal 
prerogative the Supreme Court promulgated in Myers v. U.S.; and the significant modifi-
cations to that prerogative  brought about by the proliferation of Independent Regulatory 
Commissions  and enshrined  by the Supreme Court in Humphrey’s Executor v. U.S.2 
By contrast, The Forgotten Presidents: Their Untold Constitutional Legacy stresses 
the role of incremental change in the evolution of the presidency.3 It focuses on thirteen 
“forgotten” presidents to show that even the least appreciated, most obscure of our chief 
executives made important contributions to the presidency.4 Gerhardt likens the accretion 
of precedents added on by many presidents to the common law made by courts.5 “Like the 
                                                          
 * Professor of Political Science, Boston College.  
 1. J. DAVID ALVIS, JEREMY D. BAILEY, & F. FLAGG TAYLOR, IV, THE CONTESTED REMOVAL POWER, 1789-
2010 (2013).  
 2. Id.; Myers v. U.S., 272 U.S. 52 (1926); Humphrey’s Executor v. U.S., 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
 3. MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FORGOTTEN PRESIDENTS: THEIR UNTOLD CONSTITUTIONAL LEGACY 
(2013). 
 4. Id. at xv. 
 5. Id. at xii. 
1
Landy: Incrementalism v. Disjuncture: The President and American Politic
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2014
636 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:635  
common law, the power of the presidency has developed incrementally, one decision at a 
time and depends on precedent made by presidents, not courts.”6 Gerhardt ostentatiously 
ignores the contributions made by the Mount Rushmore presidents and skips over their 
allegedly transformational accomplishments. Instead, as the title implies, his book is de-
voted to the study of the thirteen presidents he deems to be the most obscure to emphasize 
how much the construction of the office owes to even its least prominent occupants. He 
thus dissents from the disjunctive approach inherent in the “Big Bang Theory” of executive 
branch development, the notion that the major changes in the office occurred at a few 
critical transformational periods.7 Landy and Milkis call them “conservative revolutions.”8 
Steven Skowronek calls them “reconstructions.”9 
POSITIONS IN THE CONTEXT 
The Contest Removal Power tells a great story of epic struggles between the 
branches and among members of the Supreme Court, but it is no mere narrative. It reveals 
how the removal contests embody and elucidate core questions of American constitution-
alism and American political development. Since the Constitution does not mention re-
movals, the book’s careful scrutiny of the ongoing debate enables the authors to define the 
positions that were present during the original removal power contest and that continued 
to define the contours of debate in the subsequent ones: 
 
1. Advise and Consent: The Constitution requires that the Senate give 
its advice and consent to a removal. 
2. Congressional Delegation: The Constitution provides Congress 
with the authority to delegate this power where Congress pleases. 
3. Executive Power Theory: The Constitution locates this power with 
the president.10 
 
A fourth position, that impeachment is the sole removal avenue the Constitution 
provides figured in the original 1789 debate but, unlike the other three, did not continue to 
play a significant role in the subsequent removal contests.11 Although Congressional Del-
egation arguments play a role in subsequent contests these are not as consequential as the 
arguments made on the basis of Executive Power Theory and Advise and Consent. For 
brevity’s sake, this review concentrates upon Alvis, Bailey and Taylor’s account of those 
two positions. 
Both those positions endure but they have also undergone crucial changes of sub-
stance and emphasis. For example, Jefferson and Jackson’s defense of Executive Power 
Theory relied heavily on Madison’s defense of Executive Power Theory. But each added 
rationales of its own. Likewise, there is considerable overlap between Hamilton’s opposi-
                                                          
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at xvi. 
 8. MARC LANDY AND SIDNEY M. MILKIS, PRESIDENTIAL GREATNESS 4 (2000). 
 9. STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE: LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN 
ADAMS TO GEORGE BUSH 36-39 (1993). 
 10. ALVIS ET AL., supra note 1, at 7. 
 11. Id. at 24. 
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tion to the Executive Power Theory and that proffered by the proponents of the independ-
ent regulatory commissions a century later, but the differences between the two arguments 
are equally salient. Thus the reader must come to grips both with fundamental aspects of 
constitutional contestation that endure throughout the course of American political devel-
opment and with the ways that revised understandings of the meaning and nature of de-
mocracy and of the purposes and scope of government changed the game. 
The root cause of the contest about removals is the Constitution’s silence on the 
matter. Article Two delineates the president’s appoint power replete with the requirement 
that Senate advise and consent (which quickly boiled down to consent) to all appointments 
not considered “inferior”: 
 
[H]e shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the 
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, 
Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, 
whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which 
shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Ap-
pointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President 
alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.12 
 
But there is no concomitant statement about how these officers are to be removed. 
Participants in the removal debate have been free to fill the void with whatever meaning 
comports best with their predilections concerning how the president and Congress should 
function and how the two branches should relate to one another. 
 EXECUTIVE POWER THEORY: WASHINGTON TO JACKSON 
In the early going, the most prominent proponent of Executive Power Theory was 
the man who was Commander-in-Chief before he was ever president, George Washington. 
Whether commanding soldiers or bureaucrats, Washington believed that a chief executive 
could only do his duty if he could control the behavior of his underlings.13 It is more sur-
prising that James Madison agreed with Washington and, as a member of the House of 
Representatives, led the fight to enshrine that view into law.14 Madison had not always 
been such a fan of executive power. His blueprint for the Constitution, the so-called Vir-
ginia Plan, did not provide for a strong executive.15 But he seems to have accepted the 
essential argument proffered by Washington and other champions of executive power that 
granting the president removal power was not simply a means to aggrandize the office; it 
was the only way to hold the president accountable for his actions. If he could not remove 
disobedient underlings, he could not be held responsible for the courses of action they 
took. Therefore what at first brush seemed like a broadening of presidential power was, 
properly understood, also a means for checking it. 
                                                          
 12. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
 13. ALVIS ET AL., supra note 1, at 10, 27, 76, 92.  
 14. Id. at 98. 
 15. Edmund Randolph, Variant Texts of the Virginia Plan, TEACHING AMERICAN HISTORY, http://teach-
ingamericanhistory.org/library/document/variant-texts-of-the-virginia-plan/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2015). 
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Accountability is stressed by all subsequent adherents of exclusive presidential re-
moval power. But as The Contested Removal Power shows, Jefferson and Jackson add 
critical democratic dimensions to their rationales for granting sole removal power to the 
president. Jefferson’s expanded understanding of the removal power was tied to his 
broader transformation of the presidential office.16 Unlike Washington and the Federalists, 
Jefferson was a democrat and he considered the president to be democrat-in-chief. The 
president represented the will of the people and therefore he required removal power in 
order to do the people’s bidding. Although Jefferson claimed to abhor political parties, he 
defended the removal of Federalists on the grounds that even if they were not a full-fledged 
party they were a political faction that opposed his policies and hence were obstructing the 
people’s will. His ambivalence toward party, and toward his role as party leader kept him 
from engaging in a wholesale purge of Federalists. But he did remove a goodly number of 
them, claiming to do so not in the name of Republican Party triumphalism but simply to 
bring about a rough parity between the number of Republican and Federalist office hold-
ers.17 
Jackson shared Jefferson’s democratic understanding of the presidency but not Jef-
ferson’s ambivalence toward party. Therefore, he abandoned his idol’s desultory approach 
to removal in favor of a more systematic replacement of incumbent officials who had sup-
ported his rivals with loyal Jacksonian Democrats. Removals would now follow the party 
line according to the principle of rotation in office, a principle that his partisan opponents, 
the Whigs, would cheerfully adhere to, as would their successors the Republicans.18 
As we shall soon see, Jackson’s support of frequent rotation in office in line with the 
election returns was diametrically opposed to Hamilton’s support for continuity in office. 
Jackson believed that if office holders remain in place for too long they would come to 
view their office as their personal property. In Jackson’s mind, those offices were the peo-
ple’s and any incumbent was merely a transient guest. 
ADVISE AND CONSENT: FROM HAMILTON TO THE RADICAL REPUBLICANS 
As the Federalist Papers he authored on the presidency demonstrate, Alexander 
Hamilton was a great champion of a strong executive.19 But in Federalist 77 he parts with 
the Executive Power Theory to support making the Senate a full partner in executive re-
moval. “The consent of that body [the Senate] would be necessary to displace as well as 
to appoint.”20 This was not a contradiction. Involving the Senate would actually strengthen 
the Executive Branch by contributing to the stability of the administration. In contempo-
rary parlance the administration refers to the governance of a particular president, as in the 
Obama Administration but that was not Hamilton’s usage or meaning. In his mind the 
administration transcends the tenure of any particular president. 
Even in the absence of full-fledged political parties, Hamilton could see that the 
election of new presidents, especially if they were significantly at odds with their prede-
cessor would create inexorable pressure to interrupt steady administration by replacing 
                                                          
 16. Id. at 49. 
 17. Id. at 48-55. 
 18. Id. at 67-72. 
 19. JOHN JAY, ALEXANDER HAMILTON & JAMES MADISON, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS (1961). 
 20. Id. at 459. 
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those whose views differed from the new incumbent. The Senate would serve as a very 
useful obstacle to such turnover: 
 
A change of the Chief Magistrate, therefore, would not occasion so vio-
lent or so general a revolution in the officers of the government as might 
be expected, if he were the sole disposer of offices. Where a man in any 
station had given satisfactory evidence of his fitness for it, a new Presi-
dent would be restrained from attempting a change in favor of a person 
more agreeable to him, by the apprehension that a discountenance of the 
Senate might frustrate the attempt, and bring some degree of discredit 
upon himself. Those who can best estimate the value of a steady admin-
istration, will be most disposed to prize a provision which connects the 
official existence of public men with the approbation or disapprobation 
of that body which, from the greater permanency of its own composi-
tion, will in all probability be less subject to inconstancy than any other 
member of the government.21 
 
Its slow turnover gave the Senate a steadiness capable of preserving that same qual-
ity in the administration. Any official worth his salt could cultivate enough support among 
senators so that he could most likely thwart the effort of a hostile president to oust him. 
With the aid of Senatorial involvement Hamilton foresaw the development of a body of 
administrators whose lengthy tenure and relative immunity from political pressure would 
enable them to acquire the experience and expertise needed to make sound decisions and 
bring complex enterprises to fruition. He envisaged the establishment of an administrative 
body along the lines of what came to be the British Civil Service. As he feared, in the 
absence of Senate advice and consent, presidents from Jackson onward felt no compunc-
tion about removing enemies and using the ensuing vacancies to reward friends. 
The desire to preserve stability of administration made Hamilton as much a foe of 
unvarnished congressional involvement in removal as of presidential dominance. The very 
qualities that made the House of Representatives a vital democratic component of the con-
stitutional order—its large size and the short duration of members’ terms—made it unsuit-
able for participation in either appointments or removal: 
 
A body so fluctuating and at the same time so numerous, can never be 
deemed proper for the exercise of that power. Its unfitness will appear 
manifest to all, when it is recollected that in half a century it may consist 
of three or four hundred persons. All the advantages of the stability, both 
of the Executive and of the Senate, would be defeated by this union, and 
infinite delays and embarrassments would be occasioned.22 
 
Note Hamilton’s prescience in envisaging that the Union would grow so large as to 
require the House to expand to virtually its present size. Such a continental enterprise 
would have even greater need of the steady administration that only Senatorial removal 
                                                          
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 463. 
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consent could provide than did the mere strip of coastline, with some fingers pointed in-
land, that comprised the United States of his day. 
Hamilton, posthumously, got his wish many decades later when Congress passed the 
Tenure of Office Act of 1867.23 It required Senate agreement to the removal of any ap-
pointee to whom it had previously given its consent.24 Like the protagonist in a fairy tale, 
Hamilton should have been more careful about what he wished for. The purpose of the Act 
was not to ensure steady administration but rather to shift policy-making regarding the 
defeated Confederacy from the President to the Congress. Lincoln had preached “charity 
for all.”25 While it is impossible to know entirely what that would have meant in practice 
had he lived, clearly it would not have added up to the Draconian policies pushed by the 
congressional Republican majority. One may take the Radical Republican side in the de-
bate about Reconstruction but one cannot argue that it added up to the sort of continuity 
that steady administration implies. 
MYERS V. HUMPHREY’S EXECUTOR 
The Tenure of Office Act endured for several decades after Johnson left office.26 But 
its subsequent history likewise failed to enhance steady administration. Rather it became 
a weapon wielded by the Senate in the continual battle with various presidents over the 
disposition of federal patronage. Combining the Hamiltonian means for curbing presiden-
tial power, consent by the Senate, with the end prescribed by Jackson, rotation in office, 
produced the worst possible result. It created a spoils system lacking any means for public 
accountability. Indeed it was public disgust with the congressionally-dominated patronage 
system that led to the other greatest removal restriction effort of the late nineteenth Cen-
tury, Civil Service Reform.27 
Initially, Civil Service Reform applied to only a few realms of federal public ser-
vice.28 But, within that sphere, appointments to office were made via examination rather 
than political connection and removals did not follow the election cycle but were only for 
cause. Over time, the portion of the federal service placed under civil service protection 
expanded.29 The greatest expansion took place during the New Deal, as FDR sought to 
protect the vast army of federal appointments he had made from dismissal by later, possi-
bly less progressive presidents.30 As Sid Milkis shows, FDR was no Jackson. In order to 
protect the programs he had put in place he would hamstring the ability of his popularly 
elected successors to be fully accountable to the popular will. He would use Hamiltonian 
means to achieve not Jeffersonian but Progressive ends.31 
                                                          
 23. ALVIS ET AL., supra note 1, at 99. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address, Inaugural Addresses of the Presidents of the United States 
(1989), available at http://www.bartleby.com/124/pres32.html. 
 26. See generally ALVIS ET AL., supra note 1. 
 27. Id. at 114-26. 
 28. Id.  
 29. SIDNEY M. MILKIS, THE PRESIDENT AND THE PARTIES: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN 
PARTY SYSTEM SINCE THE NEW DEAL (1993).  
 30. Id. at 115-16. 
 31. Id. at 38-47. 
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Congress repealed the Tenure of Office Act in 1887.32 This boon to the presidency 
was reinforced thirty years later by the Supreme Court’s decision in Myers v. U.S., which 
unambiguously supported executive power theory as originally articulated in 1789.33 Writ-
ing for the majority, Chief Justice Taft stated that the Constitution vests executive power 
in the president and that his ability to remove recalcitrant subordinates is essential to the 
execution of that power.34 Furthermore, the Senate was incompetent in matters of re-
moval35: 
 
When a nomination is made, it may be presumed that the Senate is, or 
may become, as well advised as to the fitness of the nominee as is the 
president, but, in the nature of things, the defects in ability or intelli-
gence as an officer under the president are facts as to which the presi-
dent, or his trusted subordinates must be better informed than the Senate 
. . . .36 
 
But what the Court giveth it can take away. Nine years after Myers it denied the president 
the power to remove commissioners of independent regulatory agencies (IRCs).37 Prior to 
the New Deal, the two outstanding IRCs were: the Interstate Commerce Commission 
(ICC) founded in 1887; and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), founded in 1914.38 The 
impetus for the creation of IRCs was twofold. Proponents of extending the reach of the 
federal government to include such matters as setting railroad rates, and punishing anti-
competitive behavior by business firms believed that such efforts required a level of im-
partiality and technical expertise that could only be achieved and maintained if they were 
kept out of the patronage process.39 And, for the most part, neither congressional support-
ers nor opponents of these new and ambitious federal initiatives favored ceding full au-
thority over them to the president.40 By establishing long terms for IRC commissioners, 
staggering their appointments so that no individual president could name a majority of 
them in a single presidential term and denying the president the power to remove them, 
except for cause, Congress severely limited the president’s ability to dominate the IRC’s.41 
But Congress did not entirely undermine its own ability to influence the IRCs.42 It retained 
the ability to exercise removal power over commissioners by reducing the length of their 
terms in office as it did to FTC commissioners in 1930, and to make use of riders to IRC 
appropriations bills to accomplish the same thing.43 
                                                          
 32. ALVIS ET AL., supra note 1, at 113. 
 33. JUDGING EXECUTIVE POWER 7 (Richard J. Ellis ed., 2009). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. ALVIS ET AL., supra note 1, at 161. 
 38. Id. at 148. 
 39. Id. at 145. 
 40. Id. at 149-50. 
 41. Id. at 148. 
 42. Id. at 149, 156-57. 
 43. Id. at 156-57. 
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In the wake of Myers, FDR expected that the Supreme Court would overturn con-
gressional efforts to deprive him of the authority to remove IRC commissioners.44 How-
ever, when FDR tried to fire William Humphrey, a Coolidge appointed FTC commis-
sioner, the Court in Humphrey’s Executor v. U.S., overruled the president.45 It determined 
that the FTC was not, strictly speaking, an executive agency but rather an entity with 
“quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative” duties.46 Therefore, the precedent set by Myers grant-
ing the president unconditional executive branch removal power did not apply.47 Thus, the 
Court upheld the argument for steady administration, at least for the very specialized set 
of hybrid entities the IRCs purportedly comprised.48 
FDR responded to Humphrey’s Executor by launching a full scale assault on the 
very concept of IRCs. The Committee on Administrative Management he appointed rec-
ommended folding all the IRC’s into existing cabinet departments and terminating their 
independent status.49 Alas, Congress would not accept this recommendation and so matters 
stand to this day.50 The Executive Power theory is the dominant element regarding presi-
dential removal power but the continued existence of IRC’s as well as the extensive pro-
tections offered via civil service regulations place severe limits on the president’s power. 
Neither Washington nor Hamilton have entirely won out, the contest continues. 
THE FORGOTTENS 
There are three important lessons to be drawn from focusing on the Forgottens, as 
Gerhard urges readers to do. First, genuine precedents were established by a few of the 
forgotten president that influenced the future course of the presidency.51 Second, the devi-
ation of all four of the Whig presidents from anti-executive power Whig party orthodoxy 
shows just how strong a tug the presidential office and its perquisites exercise over those 
who come to occupy it.52 This is true even when the incumbent has previously expressed 
reservations about presidential power.53 Finally, one comes to appreciate the important 
role played by the three “Anti-Greats”—Cleveland, Taft, and Coolidge. I call them the 
Anti-Greats to emphasize that, unlike most of the other “Forgottens,” they were not medi-
ocre. They were as strongly dedicated to their belief in limited government and protection 
of private property as the Progressive were to expanding government and altering property 
rights.54 They were not “conservative revolutionaries.”55 They were conservative con-
servatives. They fought hard and well for their convictions. 
The first and most important precedent set by a “Forgotten” was John Tyler’s. The 
                                                          
 44. Id. at 162. 
 45. Id. at 161. 
 46. Id. at 161-62. 
 47. Id. at 162. 
 48. JUDGING EXECUTIVE POWER, supra note 33, at 20. 
 49. ALVIS ET AL., supra note 1, at 168-69. 
 50. Id. at 171-72. 
 51. GERHARDT, supra note 3, at xii-xiii. 
 52. Id. at xii. 
 53. Id. at 26. 
 54. Id. at 128, 172, 191. 
 55. LANDY & MILKIS, supra note 8, at 200.  
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original Constitution was unclear about what was to happen if a president died in office.56 
It simply said that in such an event, the vice president shall discharge “the Powers and 
Duties of the said Office”57 Does that mean that the vice president serves on an interim 
basis? If so, how long is the interim? Does he continue to do so for the entire unexpired 
term or merely until a special election is held? William Henry Harrison was the first pres-
ident to die in office.58 Upon learning of Harrison’s death, Tyler rushed to Washington and 
immediately called an emergency meeting of Harrison’s cabinet.59 When Daniel Webster 
addressed him “Mr. Vice President,” he objected stating that he was now the president.60 
The Cabinet voted unanimously to recognize him as such and he was quickly sworn in by 
a District of Columbia Circuit Judge.61 Congress, faced with this fait accompli, acquiesced 
to Tyler becoming the president.62  Once this precedent was established it was never chal-
lenged.  
Grover Cleveland set a precedent when he deployed federal troops to break the Pull-
man Strike.63 This was not the first time a president summoned troops.64 Recall Washing-
ton summoning them to quell the Whiskey Rebellion and Jackson’s pledging to do so in 
response to South Carolina’s nullification threat.65 But those were responses to threats of 
insurrection.66 Although the Pullman Strike did disrupt the mails, protecting mail delivery 
was a mere pretext for Cleveland’s real motive which was to protect the property rights of 
company owners.67 Hence, he was wielding the might of the federal government to resolve 
a labor-management dispute.68 This precedent set the stage for Theodore Roosevelt’s 
threat to end the Anthracite Coal Strike of 1902 by nationalizing the coal mines and use 
federal troops to operate them.69 The irony is that in this latter instance TR was wielding 
federal military might in aid of the workers, not the capitalists. 
Calvin Coolidge appointed two special prosecutors to investigate and prosecute sus-
pected crimes occurring during his administration—those involved in the Teapot Dome 
Scandal.70 Although he was not the first to appoint special prosecutors—Grant had done 
so—he was the first not to interfere with their investigations and to allow them to follow 
up those investigations with prosecutions of federal officials.71 He is therefore, the real 
initiator of the special prosecutor phenomenon that would play such a large role in subse-
quent presidencies,72 most notably in the Nixon administration. 
                                                          
 56. GERHARDT, supra note 3, at 39. 
 57. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 1. 
 58. GERHARDT, supra note 3, at 39. 
 59. Id. at 39. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 40. 
 62. Id. at 39-40. 
 63. Id. at 164. 
 64. LANDY & MILKIS, supra note 8, at 29. 
 65. Id. at 103. 
 66. Id. at 29. 
 67. GERHARDT, supra note 3, at 164. 
 68. Id. at 163-65. 
 69. ROBERT J. CORNELL, THE ANTHRACITE COAL STRIKE OF 1902, 210-11 (1957). 
 70. GERHARDT, supra note 3, at 198. 
 71. Id. at 198-99. 
 72. Id. 
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PRESIDENTIAL AUDACITY IN WHIG CLOTHING 
The Forgotten President’s depiction of the Whig presidents shows how the presi-
dential office can bend and even suppress the political and ideological predilections of the 
office holder.73 The Whig presidents did not make politics, in the way Skowronek de-
scribes. Instead, the exigencies of being president made them. As its name implies, the 
Whig party was dedicated to curbing the power of the “king,” King Andrew, and his dyn-
asty.74 The greatest of the Whigs, Webster and Clay, never ascended to the presidency, 
although, particularly in Clay’s case, it was not for lack of trying.75 They were creatures 
of Congress, and they were committed to placing Congress, not the president, at center 
stage.76 Nonetheless, as each new Whig president came into office he found himself re-
sisting the demands of powerful congressional Whigs in order to preserve his executive 
authority.77 
This dynamic began with the very first Whig president, William Henry Harrison, 
who rebuffed Henry Clay’s effort to dictate the composition of his cabinet.78 His successor, 
John Tyler, likewise resisted congressional pressure to dictate appointments and also vio-
lated Whig orthodoxy in his use of the veto power.79 Following Washington’s precedent, 
the Whigs believed that the veto should only be exercised to overturn legislation the pres-
ident deemed to be unconstitutional.80 Tyler cast six vetoes, the most of any ante-bellum 
president (Madison cast one more if pocket vetoes are included).81 He included unconsti-
tutionality among his rationales for casting them but did not limit himself to that justifica-
tion.82 
Zachary Taylor continued the iconoclastic tradition by exercising legislative leader-
ship.83 He proposed that California and New Mexico be admitted to the Union.84 Since 
each would enter as a free state, Southern Whigs adamantly opposed the plan.85 The 
staunchest anti-slavery Whigs supported it but even they were troubled by Taylor’s asser-
tion of such aggressive presidential intervention into what Whigs believed to be the exclu-
sive preserve of Congress.86 The last Whig president, Millard Fillmore was perhaps the 
least iconoclastic but he too resisted the efforts of his Whig congressional colleagues to 
dictate his appointments.87 This impressive litany of anti-orthodoxy makes a convincing 
case that the nature of the presidency is such as to press even a reluctant incumbent against 
succumbing to the blandishments of parliamentarianism. When one actually sits in the 
                                                          
 73. Id. at xii. 
 74. Id. at 3. 
 75. Id. at 27. 
 76. Id. at 26. 
 77. Id. at xii. 
 78. Id. at 28-29. 
 79. Id. at 41, 48. 
 80. Id. at 70. 
 81. Id. at 41. 
 82. Id. at 42. 
 83. Id. at 69. 
 84. Id.  
 85. Id. at 70. 
 86. Id. at 70-71. 
 87. Id. at 89-90. 
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president’s chair, the kaleidoscope shifts. 
 ANTI-GREATS 
The significance of the Anti-Greats is twofold. First, they made critical decisions 
that at least temporarily stemmed the tide of governmental expansion. Second, they serve 
as the model of the presidential road not taken, a model that may prove of more than his-
torical significance if the contemporary presidency continues to founder. 
As president, Cleveland led the fight to repeal the Silver Purchase Act, which sought 
to increase inflation by taking the US off a strict gold standard.88 The Gold Standard’s 
great virtue was that it deprived government of any ability to manipulate the currency and 
Cleveland therefore considered a vital means for keeping the government from meddling 
with the economy.89 The Act enabled government to interfere with the standard by meas-
uring its value not only in terms of the scarce metal, gold, but also in terms of a certain 
amount of the more abundant metal, silver, thus cheapening the dollar.90 The book omits 
Cleveland’s other dramatic effort to limit the reach of the federal government, his veto of 
the Texas Seed Bill.91 In the mid-1880s, Texas suffered a terrible drought.92 To keep from 
starving, Texas farmers were forced to eat their seed corn and therefore had no seeds left 
to plant.93 In response Congress appropriated ten thousand dollars to enable them to buy 
seeds.94 Cleveland vetoed the bill because the Constitution made no provision for such 
largesse, because it was not a proper activity for government and because it would under-
mine the moral character of the recipients95: 
 
I do not believe that the power and duty of the general government ought 
to be extended to the relief of individual suffering which is in no manner 
properly related to the public service or benefit . . . the lesson should be 
constantly enforced that, though the people support the government, the 
government should not support the people . . . Federal aid in such cases 
encourages the expectation of paternal care on the part of the govern-
ment and weakens the sturdiness of our national character.96 
 
William Howard Taft’s “Anti–Greatness” lay in his efforts to curb what he took to 
be the unconstitutional excesses of his predecessor Theodore Roosevelt.97 TR had repudi-
ated the strict reading of the Constitution to which all his predecessors had at least paid lip 
                                                          
 88. Id. at 156. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Cleveland and the Texas Seed Bill, BILL OF RIGHTS INSTITUTE, http://billofrightsinstitute.org/re-
sources/educator-resources/lessons-plans/presidents/texas-seed-bill/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2014). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id.  
 95. Id. 
 96. Grover Cleveland, Veto Message, Texas Seed Bill, LUDWIG VON MISES INSTITUTE (Aug. 20, 2009), 
http://mises.org/daily/3627. 
 97. GERHARDT, supra note 3, at 172-73. 
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service.98 Instead of limiting the powers of the federal government to those expressly enu-
merated in that document, he believed that the document should be interpreted to permit 
the federal government to do whatever the Constitution did not expressly forbid, as long 
as those actions were in the public interest.99 Taft sought to revive the earlier, restrictive 
understanding.100 He was especially critical of TR’s extensive use of executive orders to 
withdraw public lands for conservation purposes.101 Such policies were legislative in na-
ture and therefore required congressional not presidential action.102 When TR’s favorite, 
Forest Service head Gifford Pinchot, opposed Taft on this matter, Taft fired him.103 
Coolidge urged Congress to cut taxes and it responded with four separate tax cuts.104 
He opposed regulating farm prices, wages and working conditions and did not believe that 
the Commerce Clause should be construed to permit such interventions.105 Like Cleveland, 
he bitterly opposed federal disaster relief and on largely the same grounds.106 But unlike 
Cleveland, he lost his battle and ultimately signed a Mississippi flood disaster aid bill.107 
CONCLUSION: THE FORGOTTEN V. THE REMEMBERED 
These lessons are useful and important, but overall one is struck by how little the 
Forgottens contributed to the development of the presidency as compared to the Remem-
bered: Washington, Jackson, Lincoln and FDR. Three important precedents is not a lot to 
show for thirteen presidencies. The malleability of the Whig presidents in response to the 
exigencies of office testifies to just how powerful and enduring the precedents established 
by their memorable forebears were. The Anti-Greats were not mediocre and they certainly 
influenced the thinking and rhetoric of the modern Anti-Great, Reagan. But at least so far, 
none of their efforts have succeeded in diminishing the reach and influence of the national 
government and of its most powerful agent, the president. They did not create common 
law. 
Much of the rest of Gerhardt’s book undermines its own claims as it chronicles the 
fecklessness and the debacles of the Forgottens, which luckily did not become part of the 
“common law” of the presidency. Thus Martin Van Buren flouted the Constitution and 
supported efforts in Congress to refuse to receive anti-slavery petitions.108 Millard Fill-
more failed to emulate the more principled position taken by his predecessor, Zachary 
Taylor, who sought to bring California and New Mexico into the Union with no slavery 
strings attached. Instead, he signed the Compromise of 1850, which included the infamous 
Fugitive Slave Act.109 Franklin Pierce’s indulged in strident defense of slave-owner’s 
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rights.110 Jimmy Carter bungled his presidential transition.111 These are just a few choice 
examples; there are so many others. 
The explanatory battle between incrementalism and disjuncture is not a fair fight. 
The presidency is the only part of the constitutional order where the spotlight falls on a 
single individual. Therefore it is perhaps not so surprising that when conditions permit and 
when the incumbent possesses extraordinary qualities, big things happen. The conditions 
must be there. Ambition and political talent are not enough. TR and Bill Clinton are good 
examples of the limits imposed on presidential accomplishment by relatively quiet times. 
As Skowronek shows, the reconstructive presidents could only embark upon their trans-
formative efforts when the public was in a mood to repudiate the previous presidential 
regime. Under those propitious circumstances, talented and bold statesmen took advantage 
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